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 3 
Introduction 
Jean-Claude Juncker is considered one of the most powerful politicians in Europe (European 
Union, 17/06/2018). His position as President of the European Commission (EC) makes him 
one of the key representatives of the European Union (EU) and grants him a significant role in 
the legislative process. A leader tasked with representing the interests of a Union of 28 (soon 
to be 27) Member-States needs to be able to unify polarising ideas on the future of the EU 
into one plan. Juncker is manoeuvring himself through the minefield that is international 
relations (IR), handling dossiers like the financial stability of the Union and Brexit. However, 
he is also known for having a distinct personality. Examples are calling Viktor Orbán a 
dictator during a summit in Latvia while the EU is negotiating a dispute between itself and 
Hungary (Bloomberg, 01/06/2018) or displaying his informal way of maintaining 
relationships with other politicians by kissing and slapping them (Politico Europe, 
01/11/2015). His public behaviour is different from the stereotypical image of a ‘boring 
bureaucrat’. This begs the question whether his personality, due to his powerful position 
within the EU, has influenced EU policy during his tenure as EC President.  
 
Juncker and his Commission have acknowledged differing views on the future of the 
European project. To contribute to this discussion, they drafted a report, the ‘White Paper on 
the Future of Europe’, which was published on May 1st, 2017. In this report, the Commission 
proposes five scenarios to aim for in 2025. These five scenarios range from striving for an EU 
that entails no cooperation but a single market to a scenario in which the Union covers even 
more policy areas than it does at time of writing. The decision as to which scenario will be 
chosen lies with the Member-States (European Commission, 01/03/2017). Involving Member-
States in decision making on the future of Europe is this report’s objective as it gives the EC a 
legitimate mandate to steer the EU in a certain direction. The EU has had a problem with the 
legitimacy of their legislation due to declining turnouts in EP elections (European Parliament, 
01/07/2014), the limited role the EP has in the legislative process (Smismans, 2016, pp.343-
347) and voters voting in line with their national preferences (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, pp.551-
552). Juncker states in foreword of the White Paper that he would voice his personal opinion 
on the future of Europe in his yearly ‘State of the Union’ (European Commission, 
01/03/2017). During this speech he pleaded for a more unified EU after Brexit.  
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The State of the Union of 2017 was not the first occasion Juncker expressed his personal 
views on what’s best for Europe. He has taken a distinct position in the debate on the future of 
Europe by expressing his support for a more federalist Europe (Financial Times, 14/09/2017). 
During his State of the Union in 2015 for example he stated that “There is not enough Europe 
in this Union. And there is not enough Union in this Union.” (European Commission, 
09/09/2015).  
 
If one wants to research personality and views of a politician, the field of political psychology 
is most relevant since it primarily looks at individuals in IR. However, a problem with 
applying this political psychology-analysis to officials running a supranational organisation is 
the complexity in the structure of the organisation. The amount of parties involved in the 
policy-making process makes the influence of particular leaders difficult to recognize in 
policy. Besides the difficulty of measuring individual influence in a large international 
organisation, a case can be made for individuals not being able to influence policy in a 
significant way because of the structure of the EU. Limited influence could be due to checks 
and balances within the system as a result of the design of the legislative system of the EU 
favouring groups of people making decisions instead of a president or dictator. This structure-
agent debate will be investigated in the following section.  
 
The field of political psychology argues that individuals have an important role in 
international relations (‘t Hart, 2010, p.99-110). It is based on the importance of the ‘first 
image’, a term introduced in Kenneth Waltz’s book Man, State and War. Waltz describes 
three ‘images’ or levels of analysis with which one can explain the behaviour of States in 
International Relations (IR). The first image is the individual level, about which Waltz states 
that the behaviour of individuals shapes the behaviour of states (Waltz, 1977, p.16; Byman & 
Pollack, 2001, p.111). The second image argues that domestic (political) structures shape the 
behaviour of nations. Waltz’s third image explains states behaviour by looking at the relative 
position of the state in the international system. Waltz states that the third image is the most 
adequate tool to explain IR and rejects the first image, the individual, as an influencing actor 
in policymaking. He does not feel like the individual level as unit of analysis provides 
accurate explanations for state behaviour (Waltz, 1977, pp. 159-164; Byman & Pollack, 2001, 
p.111). 
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Byman and Pollack however, argue that state intentions are formed by individuals, making 
the preferences and personalities of individuals important when attempting to understand a 
state’s intentions (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp.111-114). They rebut Waltz’s objection to 
using the first image that human nature is constant while IR is not constant. Byman and 
Pollack state that there is variance between and within humans, each person possesses a 
different mixture of personality traits. An analysis of the distribution of these traits could 
provide theories concerning their impact on politics (Byman and Pollack, 2001, p.112).   
To support their position on the importance of the first image, Byman and Pollack use five 
historical events to show the reader that leaders and Waltz’s first image can have an influence 
on IR. They do this by looking at five different historical cases of political leaders who all 
made an impact on IR. They discuss Hitler, who was responsible for the rise as well as the 
downfall of the Third Reich (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp.118-120). Byman and Pollack also 
make this argument for Otto von Bismarck, Napoleon Bonaparte, Saddam Hussein and others 
to prove that the first image plays an important role in IR and an analysis of individuals can 
produce testable hypotheses (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp.114-132).  
 
Jean-Claude Juncker’s powers come nowhere close to the powers of some authoritarian 
leaders in Byman and Pollack research. However, there is also research available proving that 
leaders in more liberal political system can influence decision-making and policy. An 
example is Hermann research on Bill Clinton during the first seven months of his first 
administration. She linked Bill Clinton’s personality traits to the decision-making process 
within the White House (Hermann, 1994). The applicability of the individual as useful level 
of analysis is further proven by Kaarbo & Hermann (1998), as they show that individuals 
(more specifically prime ministers and not just presidents of the United States) can influence 
the policy-making process. These studies are examples from the field of political psychology, 
proving that the individual can be influential in policy-making. This research design will be 
applied to Jean-Claude Juncker, to determine whether an individual in his position can 
influence an institution like the EU.   
 
When researching the potential influence of Juncker’s leadership style, a method of 
quantitative content analysis will be used. The next section will elaborate on this method. The 
theoretical expectation (hypothesis) of this research is a limited influence of Juncker’s 
leadership style. Because of the way the legislative procedure of the EU is structured there are 
multiple parties involved in the policy-making process, possibly making it hard to measure 
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the influence of Juncker as an individual instead of the influence of the Commission in 
general. However, Juncker has a leading role in the Commission and is capable through his 
office to make some decisions without the involvement of others (like the Selmayr 
appointment, the second part of this thesis will elaborate on this situation). It looks to be hard 
to detect the influence of Juncker as an individual but due to his leading role not impossible.  
 
This thesis looks to explore the hypothesis of leaders of international organisations having a 
significant impact in the policy it produces. In sum, the research question of this thesis is as 
follows: 
 
“What has been the influence of Jean-Claude Juncker’s leadership style on the evolution of 
the European Union?”  
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Literature Review 
How does one determine the leadership style of a leader? How does the EC function? Does its 
structure allow Jean-Claude Juncker to influence policy? This next section elaborates on the 
analytical model used to determine leadership traits and leadership style, as well as expand on 
the structure of the organisation Juncker manoeuvres in as a politician.    
 
The Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) 
What is Leadership Trait Analysis? 
The Leadership Trait Analysis is a model of quantitative content analysis developed by 
Margaret Hermann that defines the personality traits of a political leader. By comparing the 
scores on these traits to the means of other politicians it can be determined whether the leader 
that is subject of analysis scores high or low on the traits in comparison to others. Through 
combining the high, average and low scores the leadership style of the leader in question can 
be defined (Hermann, 2005, p.184). Hermann defines leadership style as: “(…)  the ways in 
which leaders relate to those around them—whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders—
and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide 
such interactions.” (Hermann, 2005, p.181).  
 
The seven traits Hermann measures with her Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) are:  
“(1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power 
and influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people 
in one’s environment), (4) self-confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on problem 
solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing 
with others’ ideas and sensitivities, (6) general distrust or suspiciousness of others, and 
(7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias.” (Hermann, 2005, p.184).  
These seven leadership traits will be used to answer three questions to define the leadership 
style of a leader. These three questions are ‘How do leaders react to political constraints in 
their environment?’, ‘How open are leaders to incoming information?’ and ‘What are the 
leaders’ reasons for seeking their positions?’ (Hermann, 2005, pp.181-182). Looking at the 
leader’s reaction to political constraints there are two possibilities: respecting constraints or 
challenging them. The leader can try to meet the obstacle head-on and try and overcome it, or 
he or she can be more flexible and responsive to the environment and adapt to the new 
situation with the constraint in place. Openness to incoming information studies the degree to 
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which leaders are susceptible to information coming from their surroundings and if they 
change their course of action if they are influenced by conflicting information. Leaders either 
are open to information of closed to information. The third question researches the motivation 
of politicians to seek office, whether they are problem-focused or relationship-focused 
(Hermann, 2005, pp.181-182).  
 
Based on the personality trait scores answers to the three questions can be formulated. For 
example, a leader with a high belief in controlling events and a high need for power 
challenges constraints rather than respect them. Low scores on these two traits mark a leader 
with respect for the constraints around him. A higher score on ‘conceptual complexity’ than 
on the trait ‘self-confidence’ means that a leader is more open to information. By looking at 
the scores in this fashion the three initial questions can be answered. The answers to these 
questions form the leadership style, of which Margaret Hermann has defined eight: 
‘expansionistic’, ’evangelistic’, ‘actively independent’, ‘directive’, ‘incremental, ‘influential’, 
‘opportunistic’ and ‘collegial’ (Hermann, 2005, p.185).  
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Table 1. 8 types of Leadership Style (Hermann, 2005, p.185).  
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How can we study leadership traits? 
How are the leadership traits, needed to determine the leadership style of Juncker, derived 
from public appearances of a political leader? To conduct the LTA a coding scheme and web-
application of the company Social Science Automaton is used (Social Science Automation, 
2013). The online coding scheme analyses written materials (in English), which are 
transcripts of interviews and speeches conducted by the subject at hand and uses a word-
analysis technique to determine the leadership style of the subject. These written materials are 
transcripts derived from oral sources. To specify the analysis the program conducts, 
ProfilerPlus is counting frequency of certain words and analyses linguistic features like the 
use of synonyms or lack thereof (Hermann, 2005, p.196).  
 
How does it relate to decision-making? 
How can a link be made between the leadership style of Juncker and the policy made by the 
EU? In what way is the influence of Juncker’s personality on policy measurable? Previous 
research on the subject of the Leadership Trait Analysis focuses on defining the leadership 
style before looking at the foreign policy a country generates and analysing this to establish 
any influence of the leader in question. By defining the type of leadership style that is 
applicable, certain characteristics can be linked to having this style. For example, a leader can 
be polarising in his or her views and refuse to cooperate with other people. This would 
translate in policy of the same kind. 
 
From 1980 until now Hermann has researched lots of leadership traits and styles in political 
leaders. However, a causal link between personality and policy outcomes has not yet been 
made. An example of this is Hermann’s research on Bill Clinton’s first administration. During 
this research she was able to gather information about the policy-making process and 
dynamics between Clinton and his staff during this process, granting her room to look at 
authority patterns and the links between his charisma and group-dynamics, instead of just 
analysing the policy as an outcome (Hermann, 1994). In the case of research on Juncker 
however, the only available information is at the back end of the policy-making process. 
Distinguishing the influence of his leadership style on policy is more difficult if there is little 
to no insight available with regards to the process within the EC. 
 
One author who researches the outcome of the policy-making process is Dyson (2006). Dyson 
compares Tony Blair’s scores on the LTA to policy towards Iraq. Unfortunately, a problem of 
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comparing Dyson’s research to this thesis is the position Tony Blair has within the decision 
unit on war policy. Juncker has a much less authority on any of the policy areas the EU is 
responsible for when compared to Blair’s power in military policy areas, where Blair takes a 
leading role in the decision-making as prime minister. Research on the impact of the 
personality of Margaret Thatcher by Dyson in 2009 has the same limitations for this research 
as she almost dictated Britain’s Foreign Policy on her own (Dyson, 2009).  
 
To research the potential link between EU policy and Juncker’s personality, Juncker’s 
leadership style will be determined and a comparison between his personality traits and EU 
policy that resembles these traits will be made. The policy used in this analysis will stem from 
the same period of time as the materials used in ProfilerPlus. However, when drawing 
conclusions, it must be noted that Juncker takes a less central role in the policy-making 
process compared to other political leaders previously researched in political psychology. 
This makes it harder to establish a direct link between his personality and EU policy. 
 
 
The European Commission 
The EC is the executive power of the EU. Its main goal is promoting the general interest of 
the EU (European Commission, 11/10/2017; Egeberg, 2016, pp.126-128). Commissioners 
represent the interests of the EU and in no way are allowed to forward their country’s interests 
in their function (Egeberg, 2016, p.129). Different policies and policy areas are distributed 
within the portfolios of 28 Commissioners, one for each Member-State, the President 
included. The 28 Commissioners are called the ‘College of Commissioners’ or the ‘College’. 
The EC as an institution also entails several administrative branches and Directorates General 
each headed by a Commissioner. The influence of the EC in the legislative process is 
significant since the most frequently used legislative process can only be initiated by a 
proposal from the EC (Article 294(2) TEU in Foster, 2017, p.96).  
 
The Commission also has the power to oversee the implementation and enforcement of EU 
policies, but due to the limited amount of words allowed in this thesis the scope of this section 
on the EC will be narrowed down to the Commission’s power to initiate legislation.   
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The European legislative process 
The EU knows two general legislative procedures to produce legislative acts: the ordinary 
legislative procedure and the special legislative procedure. The former procedure is more 
frequently used than the latter (European Council, 28/02/2018). In EU law it is categorised in 
the Treaties per policy area which legislative procedure is to be used. For instance, if the 
Commission wants to implement policy on humanitarian aid it needs to follow the ordinary 
legislative procedure (Art. 209 TFEU in Foster, 2017, p.77). The ordinary legislative 
procedure consists of a co-decision mechanism between the European Parliament (EP) and 
the Council of the EU (The Council). The Commission submits a proposal to both organs at 
the same time. The EP and the Council will from that point forward negotiate a joint position 
on the proposal in two phases (readings) of negotiation and exchange positions. The proposal 
is adopted successfully of both the EP and the Council accept it. If there is no agreement from 
either party on the proposal, the legislative act will not be adopted. According to the Treaties 
the Commission has a monopoly on initiatives (Article 294 TFEU in Foster, 2017, p.96; 
Barnard & Peers, 2017, p.46). In practice however, the EP can request the EC to submit a 
proposal (European Parliament, 24/07/2012), but the EC maintains the right to accept or 
decline this request (Egeberg, 2016, p.126). The course of the special legislative procedure is 
determined ad hoc. A common feature between the procedures of the ordinary and special 
legislative procedure is that the Commission also initiates the special legislative procedure 
(European Council, 09/11/2017).  
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Figure 1. The ordinary legislative procedure (European Commission, 31/01/2012).  
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The election of the President 
Since the president is no ordinary Commissioner, the way he is elected into office is different. 
This process is called the ‘Spitzenkandidaten process’. The Spitzenkandidaten process is an 
interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which states that the European Council shall 
nominate a candidate for the function of Commission President for the EP to approve. The 
precise procedure is not mentioned in the treaty but was agreed upon between all involved 
parties (the Council, EP, EC, Member-States etc.) (European Parliament, 07/02/2014). The 
European Council and the EP agreed upon letting each party in the EP choose a candidate 
from their own ranks (the Spitzenkandidat) to nominate for the function of Commission 
President. After the elections of the EP the nominee of the biggest party in the EP will 
become Commission President (European Parliament, 07/02/2014). This process of 
appointment is a more politicized process than ever (Peterson, 2017, p.353), since the 
President is chosen from the EP. The European Council has become increasingly hesitant 
concerning the procedure. Opponents of the process state that the Spitzenkandidaten process 
favours the EP over the European Council (Dinan, 2015, p.96).  
 
The powers of the President 
What is the influence of Juncker’s position within the Commission and within the EU? 
Firstly, the President can choose from candidates forwarded by Member-States. He is also 
able to reject nominations of candidates by Member-States (Egeberg, 2016, p.129). Juncker 
cannot hand pick his College, but by using this veto he can force the Member-State into 
proposing someone else. Secondly, he has the power of dismissal. If the Commission does not 
function properly according to the EP, the EP’s has the power to dismiss the College as a 
whole. However, this is a difficult tool to apply as it requires a hard to reach qualified 
majority vote in the EP (Barnard & Peers, 2017, p.45). Secondly, when a Commissioner does 
not function according to the wishes of the President he can dismiss Commissioners 
individually, a power that is much greater than the dismissive power the EP possesses 
(Barnard & Peers, 2017, p.42). Thirdly, Juncker can reshuffle the College and (re-)divide 
portfolios (Barnard & Peers, 2017, p.42). A fourth power of the EC President is an agenda 
setting power. Juncker decides what policy proposals the College discusses and votes on 
(Müller, 2017) 
 
Egeberg argues that a process of ‘presidentialization’ is taking place, where the president of 
the Commission may end up above other Commissioners when hierarchy is concerned 
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(Egeberg, 2016, p.129). An example is the way consensus is reached within the Commission. 
Even though the President does not have a vote with more weight than other Commissioners, 
he or she mediates the process of seeking consensus in the Commission’s decision-making 
process (Egeberg, 2016 p.129). Kurpas argues that this is process is already completed 
because the President has the power to allocate portfolios and the power to demand the 
resignation of individual Commissioners, possessing far more and different powers than other 
Commissioners (Kurpas et al., 2008, p.32). The European Parliamentary Research Service 
states that the President even has the power instruct individual Commissioners within their 
portfolios (EPRS, 2014, p.3). This means that Juncker ultimately has the last say with regards 
to all policy areas the Commission has competence over and is able to apply his view on the 
policy subject even when it concerns the portfolio of one of his Commissioners.  
 
After being approved by the European Council, Juncker revised the system of Vice-Presidents 
in the Commission to control the other Commissioners (besides the vice presidents) in his 
College (Hodson, 2015, p.158). Each Vice-President leads a project group with a specific goal 
(for example ‘Jobs, Growth and Investment’), managing a group of Commissioners to attain 
this goal (European Commission, 10/09/2014). Each project team has a clear task (European 
Commission, 10th September 2014), which Juncker expects them to complete. This more 
concrete way of goal-setting makes the progress more measurable at the end of his term. 
Through this system, Juncker also concentrates power around him and his trusted Vice-
Presidents. A disadvantage of this reform is the Vice-Presidential veto, which could prove to 
make it more difficult for Juncker to pass his personal vision (Hodson, 2015, p.158). 
 
Structural limitations 
What are the structural limits of Jean-Claude Juncker’s influence as Commission President? 
Firstly, because of the way the voting procedure within the Commission is laid out, Juncker as 
an individual cannot make decision on his own on behalf of the Commission. When voting, 
the vote of the Commission President carries the same weight as the votes of the other 
Commissioners (Egeberg, 2016, p.129). The President has no veto in Commission proposals 
(Barnard & Peers, 2017, p.42). These voting guidelines mean that Juncker needs the backing 
of his College to initiate the procedure. Secondly, as we can derive from the process of the 
ordinary legislative procedure, the Commission as a whole can propose legislation but is does 
not have the final say as to whether this legislation is passed. As explained above, this 
competence lies with the EP and the Council (Drachenberg & Brianson, 2016, p.204). This 
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means that the Commission can propose legislation it favours, but when the proposal lacks 
support among other institutions this legislation will not pass.  
 
 
Summarising, not only does Juncker’s function have considerable power in the legislative 
process of the EU, Jean-Claude Juncker has also been vocal about his ambitions as 
Commission President. He expressed his views on his function, stating that he would not 
merely be a secretary general for the EU but a prominent agenda-setter (Dinan, 2015, p.98; 
Hodson, 2015, p.157). These statements lead us to believe he is aware of and using the degree 
to which he is involved in EU policy-making. Taking this assertive attitude into account, as 
well as his influence as Commission President concerning the legislative procedure, the 
appointment of Commissioners, in decision-making all portfolios within the Commission, 
Juncker seems like a powerful politician within the European legislative framework.  
 
Evolution of the EU 
What is defined as the ‘Evolution of the European Union’ in this research? The policy used to 
compare Juncker’s leadership traits to is policy that impacts the functioning and the future of 
the EU. Policy shaping a new institution or agency is an example of a type that impacts the 
functioning of the EU. A democratic process initiated to determine if the Union gets more 
responsibilities or has to take a step back from some policy areas in the future, like the White 
Paper on the Future of Europe, is an example of impact on the future of the EU. A comparison 
between these types of impactful materials and Juncker’s leadership style will decide whether 
he influenced the future of Europe.   
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Methods: Conducting the LTA 
Two types of materials can be used in an LTA: spontaneous (private) and non-spontaneous 
(public) materials. Spontaneous materials consist of interviews and Q&As at press 
conferences because the individual has to formulate answers on the spot. Non-spontaneous 
materials are speeches and reports as the leader has time to carefully formulate an answer. 
The difference between these two types of materials lies in determining the traits of the leader 
that is the subject of analysis. In the case of high-ranked politicians and government officials 
it is expected that a team of speechwriters provides these leaders with consistent policy 
statements on the subject. These speechwriters dictate what the leader in question is going to 
say in his speeches. This makes the coding scheme measure the leadership traits of the 
speechwriter instead of the political leader (Hermann, 1980, p.14-15). Interviews offer a more 
unexpected line of questioning, putting the leader more on the spot in its answering of the 
questions. This leaves less space for calculated answers and more space for the opinion of the 
leader itself on the matter (instead of the opinions of his or her speechwriters). Hermann states 
that leaders being put on the spot in interviews makes their behaviour and statements quite 
spontaneous (Hermann, 2005, p.179) and argues that it is preferable to minimize the effects of 
this phenomenon called ‘ghost writing’ by using more spontaneous materials (Hermann, 
1980, p.14-15). She also states that the relationship between the materials and the leadership 
traits is stronger (Hermann, 1980, p.15).  
 
For the Leadership Trait Analysis conducted on Juncker in this thesis, 50 entries are used in 
the ProfilerPlus coding scheme of Margaret Hermann’s LTA. Due to the increased accuracy 
of LTA scores spontaneous materials were preferred. However, due to the limited availability 
of spontaneous materials during the designated time (01/11/2014 to 01/03/2017), to attain the 
minimum amount of entries for an accurate score (50 entries) non-spontaneous materials were 
also used. Of the 50 entries, 35 entries were non-spontaneous materials (70% of total amount 
of materials) and 15 entries spontaneous materials (30% of total amount of materials). All 
spontaneous materials that could be found were used. The remainder of the entries, the non-
spontaneous materials, were randomly selected from the European Commission Press Release 
Database.  
 
What effect does this distribution between types of materials have on the outcomes of the 
LTA? Jonathan Renshon conducted research in 2009 on the subject of difference between 
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public and private materials in an analysis of the Operational Code (OC) of a leader. OC 
analysis falls within the field of political psychology and is, like LTA, a content analysis to 
determine the belief systems of political figures. It uses a similar method to LTA when 
analysing texts, like looking for frequency of certain words, negative or positive wordings and 
the use of synonyms (Renshon, 2008, pp.832-833). Renshon states that even public materials 
contain information that show a leader’s true beliefs (Renshon, 2009, p.652). He concludes 
his research, comparing the outcomes of public materials and private materials in content 
analysis, by stating that the outcomes of both analyses were very comparable (Renshon, 2009, 
p.657-658).  
 
Research by Suedfeld & Bluck (1988) supports Renshon’s notion concerning public 
materials. Suedfeld and Bluck state that an actor unknowingly reveals certain beliefs in public 
materials it tries to keep secret (Suedfeld & Bluck, 1988). This research supports Renshon’s 
statements concerning the use of public or non-spontaneous materials. Even when speeches 
are written by speech writers, they still contain clues that content analysis can derive from 
these texts.  
 
The research of Suedfeld & Bluck, as well as Renshon’s research suggest that the difference 
between using spontaneous and non-spontaneous materials in content analysis is not 
significant. This leads us to believe that the fact that most of the entries in ProfilerPlus are 
from non-spontaneous materials does not corrupt the LTA of Juncker.   
 
A second decision to make on the subject of choice of materials is the period these materials 
emanate from. What periods seem most relevant for defining his leadership style?  
The materials that will be used in ProfilerPlus will stem from the time period of 01/11/2014 
(Juncker assumes office) until the 28/02/2017 (because 01/03/2017 marks the publication of 
the White Paper). Because of the substance of the White Paper it is expected that Juncker 
knowingly took a step back to leave the decision on the future to European citizens. This 
move would mean that his influence has been limited after the date of publication and maybe 
not the genuine influence a Commission President would possess.  
 
It is also important to note on what subjects the speeches were given and interviews were 
conducted. A politician’s attitude on different subjects can vary. For example, Juncker’s 
opinion on Brexit is much more outspoken and negative than his position on the increasing 
 19 
tensions between the EU and Hungary. Contrasting political stances can lead to different 
analyses by ProfilerPlus. To prevent inconsistency in the outcomes from occurring the entries 
in ProfilerPlus will consist of materials on multiple policy areas.  
 
All non-spontaneous materials were classified in three main policy areas: ‘Europe’s Foreign 
Policy’, ‘the Future of Europe’ and ‘Economics, Finance and Monetary Policy’. Of the 35 
non-spontaneous entries, 13 were on the subject of EU Foreign Policy. Of the 35 entries, 8 
entries were on the Future of Europe, meaning that Juncker discussed a more general outlook 
on the upcoming years. 11 of the 35 entries were on the subject of Economics, Finance and 
Monetary Policy. The 3 remaining entries of the 35 total entries were the State of the Unions 
of the years 2015 through 2017. These State of the Unions cover a wide array of policy 
subjects.  
 
The spontaneous materials, consisting of interviews and Q&As during press conferences, 
have less of a problem with differentiation in policy areas. The interviews covered multiple 
policy areas at once, mostly actualities (for example Brexit, migration). Considering the fact 
that almost all but one interview (the interview with the Financial Times which only covered 
economics) fitted in multiple categories at once, no interviews had to be left out due to 
oversaturation of a certain policy subject. 
 
Juncker’s scores on Hermann’s LTA cannot be analysed on their own but must be compared 
to the scores of other leaders to determine whether Jean-Claude Juncker scores above, below 
or according to the average on these traits. The results of 122 leaders are available in 
Hermann’s research (Hermann, 2005, p.204) and will serve as material for comparison when 
analysing the outcome of Juncker’s LTA.  
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Results: Juncker’s Leadership Style 
The LTA by ProfilerPlus points out that Juncker has respect for constraints, is open to 
information and is problem-focused or relationship-focused (depending on the situation). In 
situations where he tends to be more problem-focused, Juncker is an opportunistic leader. In 
those cases, he is solution-oriented and thus adapting to the situation to see what is possible 
and what is not. During these times he tries to find a balance between the goals of his 
administration and what Member-States will allow him to do (Hermann, 2005, p.185). In 
situations where he tends to be more relationship-oriented, Juncker is a collegial leader. 
During these times he is seeking consensus in decision-making and is focused on gaining 
prestige by letting others participate in this process. He shares accountability for his actions 
with the Member-States by doing these things (Hermann, 2005, p.185). The next section 
discusses the three questions resulting in determining this leadership style and how these three 
questions result in this leadership style.  
 
Table 2. Juncker’s scores on the Leadership Trait Analysis compared with Hermann’s 
analysis of 122 political leaders (2005, p.204). 
 
LTA COMPLEET 
 
 Average Overall 
 
(n=50) 
122 Political 
Leaders 
(Hermann. 2005) 
Distrust of Others 0.063 
 
Low 
Mean = 0.38 
Low < 0.20 
High > 0.56 
Task Focus 0.710 
 
Average 
Mean = 0.62 
Low < 0.48 
High > 0.76 
Belief in One’s Own Ability to 
Control Events 
0.335 
 
Low-Average 
Mean = 0.45 
Low < 0.33 
High > 0.57 
In-Group Bias 0.121 
 
Low 
Mean = 0.43 
Low < 0.34 
High > 0.53 
Self-Confidence 0.358 
 
Low-Average 
Mean = 0.57 
Low < 0.34 
High > 0.80 
Conceptual Complexity 0.607 
 
High 
Mean = 0.45 
Low < 0.32 
High > 0.58 
Need for Power 0.264 
 
Low 
Mean = 0.50 
Low < 0.38 
High > 0.62 
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Dealing with constraints 
How leaders deal with constraints, either respecting them or challenging them, can be 
determined by looking at the scores of the analysis in two traits, ‘belief in one’s own ability to 
control events’ and ‘need for power’ (Hermann, 2005, p.187). Juncker scores on the low end 
of the spectrum on ‘belief in ability to control events’, with a score of 0.335 (low belief is a 
score below 0.33, the mean of the sample is 0.45). On the ‘need for power’ trait Juncker 
scores a 0.264, which is a very low score (Hermann, 2005, p.204). Since Juncker’s score on 
belief in ability to control events is on the boundary of low scores and nowhere near the mean 
for this trait, we will interpret his score as a moderately low score. This is due to the possible 
standard deviation from Juncker’s scores, meaning that the true score of Juncker could be 
slightly below or above his current score when more entries are used. How does a leader like 
Juncker with low scores in these areas deal with constraints? Leaders with low scores in both 
traits tend to adapt to their constraints and respect them. They aim for consensus on policy 
subjects and challenges (Hermann, 2005, p.187).  
 
Openness to incoming information 
How open a leader is to contextual information is determined by their scores on the ‘self-
confidence’ and ‘conceptual complexity’ traits. Juncker scores a 0.358 on self-confidence and 
0.67 on conceptual complexity. His score on self-confidence is moderately low, with scores 
below 0.34 being low scores and 0.57 being the mean of the 122 political leaders Hermann 
researched. On conceptual complexity Juncker’s score is high, with the mean being 0.45 and 
high scores on the trait every score above 0.58 (Hermann, 2005, p.204). Leaders like Juncker 
with higher conceptual complexity scores than self-confidence scores are more open to input 
from others. They seem concerned with the opinions of others and helping people around 
them and gather as much information as possible through a structure in which all input is 
recognized (Hermann, 2005, p.192). 
 
Motivation for seeking office 
Three traits can be used to analyse these reasons and determine why a leader wants to assume 
this position in public administration, ‘task focus’, ‘in-group bias’ and ‘distrust of others’. On 
‘task focus’ Juncker scores a 0.710, which is a moderate to high score considering the mean 
being 0.62 and high scores ranging 0.76 and over.  
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The ‘task focus’ score is moderate, suggesting that Juncker’s motivation for seeking office 
lies in both problems (an internal motivation) as well as in relationships (an external 
motivation). Whether Juncker is problem- or relationship-focused depends on the context of 
the situation (Hermann, 2005, p.198).  
 
On the ‘in-group bias’ trait Juncker scores a 0.121, which is very low considering the range 
for low scores starting at everything below 0.34 (Hermann, 2005, p.204). This is to be 
expected however, considering the position of Juncker as a representative of the EU, not his 
own Member-State. On the ‘distrust of others’ trait Juncker scores very low with a 0.063, with 
everything below 0.20 being a low score.  
 
The scores on ‘distrust of others’ and ‘in-group bias’ can be combined to determine one’s 
motivation towards the world. Hermann defines this as “whether the leader is driven by the 
threats or problems he or she perceives in the world or by the opportunities to form 
cooperative relationships.” (Hermann, 2005, p.199). Because the scores on both traits were 
low in Juncker’s case it can be concluded that he does not view the world as threatening, 
adapts to its constraints and seeks to cooperate with others. He focuses on building 
relationships and taking advantage of opportunities (Hermann, 2005, p.200).  
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Linking LTA results to policy 
Policy cases 
In het following section the leadership style of Juncker will be read in conjunction with 
certain policy events. These events are the publication of the White Paper on the Future of 
Europe, the appointment of Martin Selmayr as secretary general of the EC and the signing of 
two legislative agreements between the Council, EC and EP.   
 
The White Paper on the Future of Europe  
The aim of the White Paper on the Future of Europe is to reach consensus concerning the 
future of the EU and letting national governments and citizens choose a future. The EU has a 
problem with the legitimacy of their legislation because of low turnouts in EP elections and a 
limited role of the EP in the legislative process (Smismans, 2016, pp.343-347). Involving 
Member-States in decision making on the future of Europe is Juncker’s objective as it gives 
him a legitimate mandate to steer the EU in a certain chosen direction. The EC proposed a 
timeline of open discussion, concluding with the 2019 EP elections (European Commission, 
01/03/2017, p.28). The Commission made clear through the White Paper that these opinions 
are appreciated, stating that “every voice should be heard” (European Commission, 
01/03/2017, p.26). This marks the involvement of others in decision-making, as well as 
sharing responsibility (for the future of Europe). These developments fit very well into 
Juncker’s personality profile since he is open to incoming information in the policy process 
and seeks to cooperate with others because of his low distrust of others and low in-group bias.  
 
Juncker adapting to constraints is most noticeable when looking at future integration in 
Europe, meaning an increase in cooperation in more policy areas. Increasing distrust towards 
the EU is developing in Europe (European Commission, 01/03/2017, p.12). Juncker and other 
EU officials believe in more EU. To unite these opinions, the Commission has proposed a 
scenario in the White Paper (‘Scenario 3: Those who want to do more’) in which a ‘coalition 
of the willing’ can cooperate even more while sceptic Member-States don’t have the 
obligation to participate (European Commission, 01/03/2017, p.20). In some way this 
approach is already the case and nothing new within the Union, with different compositions 
of the Schengen Area, the European Customs Union, and the Eurozone (European 
Commission, 01/03/2017, p.7; Economist, 2007).  
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While Juncker wants to move forward he adapts to the constraints Eurosceptic opinions put 
on his vision for the future. By allowing countries to choose to participate through this third 
scenario, he can move forward with the EU in a direction he envisions with a ‘coalition of 
willing’ while respecting opinions favouring less Europe.   
 
Appointment of Martin Selmayr 
A development more negatively spoken of in news outlets is the appointment of Martin 
Selmayr as Secretary-General (SG) of the EC, one of the most powerful jobs within the 
Commission that does not require election. The appointment is frowned upon because of the 
speed (two promotions in one meeting) and the attempted secrecy surrounding it (Politico, 
22/02/2018; Financial Times, 18/04/2018). Even though the appointment was in line with 
relevant legal rules according to a published factsheet by the Commission itself (European 
Commission, 25/03/2018), it is highly frowned upon by international media and the EP 
(Politico, 22/02/2018; Financial Times, 18/04/2018). The light-speed rise of Selmayr through 
the EU ranks is technically within the rules but stretching the boundaries and possibly 
damaging the integrity of the Union as a whole. Juncker has been a supporter of Selmayr, 
proposing him as secretary general at the same moment as he informed the relevant 
Commissioner that the previous SG would resign (European Commission, 25/03/2018, 
Question 3). His loyalty to Selmayr was emphasized when he threatened to resign as 
President if the Selmayr-promotion would be reversed, stating “If Martin Selmayr goes, I go” 
(Politico, 22/03/2018).  
 
This move to put a close affiliate on one of the highest positions within the EC is an example 
of Juncker recognizing boundaries to his influence and the rules concerning appointment of 
these high functions. He adapts to them by stretching the legal rules and operating just within 
them, in the end succeeding in appointing someone of his choice.  
 
Seeking cooperation 
By analysing Juncker’s policy plans before he assumed office and his State of the Union 
addresses during his tenure two distinct types of cooperation that Juncker seeks can be 
recognized: inter-institutional cooperation within the EU and cooperation between Member-
States through the EU.    
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An example of inter-institutional cooperation is Juncker’s ambition to streamline the 
legislative process. This does not only fit into his personality profile concerning his want to 
cooperate and build relationships, but also combines well with his average to high task focus. 
In the State of the Union of 2015 and his political guidelines as candidate President he 
frequently mentions the aim to deliver on expectations and having concrete results to show for 
it (European Commission, 15/07/2014; European Commission, 09/09/2015). The signing of 
such an agreement between the Commission, Council of the EU and the EP marks a period of 
more cooperation between these three institutions (par II.6, EUR-Lex, 2016; European 
Council, 14/03/2018). The agreement aims to prioritize certain policy area’s and aim for the 
swift passing of legislation, aiming for results (II.7 and VII.42, EUR-Lex, 2016). Has 
Juncker’s leaderships style played a role in the signing of this agreement? The agreement fits 
in his leadership profile because it aims for more cooperation and shares responsibility for 
policy between three EU institutions. 
 
This agreement made the attainment of policy-goals easier. An example of sped up legislation 
due to this agreement is the increase in cooperation on the digital market, on which more 
information can be found in the next paragraph. In 2017 the Council, EP and EC signed a new 
declaration, the ‘Joint Declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2018-19’. The parties 
to the declaration recognize the upcoming EP elections and the end of the term of this 
Commission. They extend their cooperation in the legislative process to show their 
effectiveness to EU citizens and deliver on expectations (European Commission, 14/12/2017). 
Both Juncker’s task-oriented focus as well as his cooperative nature can be recognized in this 
move.  
 
 
Juncker aims for more Member-State cooperation by proposing more policy areas to 
cooperate on. An example of a new area of cooperation is the digital single market (DSM). 
Through proposals on this area the Commission tries to merge national policies on subjects 
such as cyber-security and the free movement of data (EPRS, 2018, pp.8-10). This type of 
cooperation is more classical in the sense that it is a ‘spillover-effect’ (cooperation on one 
policy area leading to cooperation on another; Jensen, 2016) and is part of the EU’s aim to 
keep the single market efficient. As a result, data roaming legislation became identical across 
all of Europe in June 2017. In 2016 the EU even adopted its first cybersecurity law (Bassot & 
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Hiller, 2017, p.9). This marked a new policy area for the EU to cooperate on, a development 
Juncker has pleaded for and impacting the evolution of the EU.    
 
 
Concluding the analysis of policy events, we can state that the fact that an individual like 
Juncker was nominated as the Spitzenkandidat for one of the EP parties and after the elections 
accepted by the European Council as Commission President (European Parliament, 
27/05/2014) makes sense according to our LTA. A leader who tries to build relationships, 
cooperate and is focused on getting results seems like the ideal candidate to unite the interests 
of Member-States and tackle problems on an EU level. Of course, there is a political aspect to 
choosing Juncker emanating from a power struggle between the European Council and the EP 
(EUobserver, 2015), but solely looking at his leadership style he seems like the right man for 
the job of EC President.  
 
A problem of causality 
In the abovementioned policy events the leadership style of Juncker is illustrated in practice. 
Juncker influences the evolution of the EU through seeking cooperation of Member-States 
and citizens in deciding its future, creating a legitimate mandate for the next Commission. He 
respects the legal boundaries of the appointment procedure of the Secretary-General of the EC 
and worked within these rules to appoint Martin Selmayr, who will hold an important office 
long after Juncker’s term is over and will influence the EU’s functioning for some time. 
Lastly, Juncker sought to cooperate with others and build relationships. He has done this with 
other institutions as well as aim for more cooperation between Member-States. However, 
drawing these connections between leadership style and EU policy reveals a problem of 
causality. 
 
This thesis has shown multiple examples of policy proposals and agreements showing 
parallels between policy and Juncker’s personality. However, because Juncker is not the only 
actor involved in the policy making process it is hard to say that the policy outcome is due to 
Juncker’s personality. An example of this lack of causality is the White Paper as an initiative 
in general. Its aim to inspire participation in the European discussion by national parliaments 
and European citizens correlates with Juncker’s openness to incoming information and 
willingness to involve others in decision-making. However, direct causality between the 
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White Paper and Juncker’s personality trait is hard to prove. We do not know if Juncker is the 
initiator of the White Paper report because it is not possible to gain an insight into the 
decision-making concerning the White Paper. Since it is not possible to directly connect 
Juncker’s personality trait ‘open to incoming information’ the conclusion of this policy 
analysis cannot go further than pointing out a correlation between Juncker’s leadership style 
and EU policy.  
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Conclusion 
Concluding this research, how has this thesis approached the question “What has been the 
influence of Jean-Claude Juncker’s leadership style on the evolution of the European 
Union?” and what is the answer this research provides?  
 
In the first part of this thesis we investigated Juncker’s position within the Commission and 
the Commission’s integral position in the EU’s legislative process. Juncker has a very 
influential position as President, for example being able to set the agenda for the College, 
appointing portfolios and demanding the resignation of individual Commissioners. 
Interpreting his influence as President in conjunction with the Commission’s influence in 
making legislation, Juncker possesses great influence in deciding what policy proposals are 
passed on to the Council and EP.   
 
In the second section, by conducting quantitative content-analysis we have determined that 
Juncker’s leadership style is opportunistic or collegial, depending on the situation at hand. 
When the context needs him to be more problem-focused he is an opportunistic leader, 
focusing on what is possible within the boundaries of his environment. When the situation 
needs him to be more relationship-focused he is a collegial leader, focused on building 
consensus and solving problems together with others.  
 
In the third section of this thesis three policy events that had impact on the evolution of the 
EU were analysed in conjunction with Juncker’s leadership style. Martin Selmayr’s 
appointment will influence the function of the EU in years to come. Juncker’s preference to 
cooperate with other EU institutions to accelerate the legislative process and reach policy-
goals made the EU able to pass many proposals in a short period of time. These policies are 
now part of EU law and contribute to the development of the EU. Possibly one of the most 
important proposals the EC, with Juncker as its frontman, initiated is a debate on the future of 
the EU through his White Paper. The outcome of this process will determine what the EU will 
look like in 2025.  
 
Despite abovementioned arguments pointing towards Juncker having a significant influence 
on the evolution of the EU, Juncker’s direct influence on policy is hard to measure. Even 
though the analysed legislation is in line with his leadership style, many individuals and 
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institutions are involved in the process making it impossible to say with absolute certainty that 
his leadership style impacted the development of the EU significantly. Without absolute 
transparency of the legislative process within the EC, parallels can be recognized between 
both variables, but a direct causal link cannot be proven. The problem with drawing 
conclusions from correlation is the danger of hidden variables. These variables cannot be 
recognised when solely looking at the policy outcomes. Apart from analyses looking at the 
policy process by using private materials of this process no framework is provided in previous 
literature to reach causality through analysing policy outcomes. Because we do not know 
what potential hidden variables are and in what proportion they influence policy, we do not 
know how much Juncker’s leadership style influenced the EU.   
 
However, in this thesis we have ascertained the importance of the EC within the legislative 
process and Juncker’s influential position within the Commission. This notion, combined with 
the parallels that can be drawn between certain policy (proposals) leads us to believe that 
leadership style is a factor that can influence policy and thus influence the evolution of the 
EU. Even though the lack of conclusive causality does not allow us to deduce how much his 
leadership style influences EU policy, it seems impossible that Juncker has had no influence 
on the evolution of the EU. This confirms the relevance of defining leadership styles of 
leaders and confirms the importance of the first image in IR.  
 
Even though the conclusion of this research is not definitive, it set out to apply the school of 
political psychology to a leader in an international organisation. Comparing Juncker to the 
mean of political leaders Hermann has researched in the past and noticing that his scores are 
not unusual, content analysis seems to have been able to depict an accurate analysis of his 
personality. Availability of materials that give insight into the policy making process, 
conversation logs and memoires of Commissioners for example, could provide us with the 
ability to establish how much the leadership style of Jean-Claude Juncker influenced EU 
policy (like Hermann did in her research of Bill Clinton’s administration in 1994). As was 
mentioned in the introduction of this thesis this research was explorative. When these kinds of 
materials become available (possibly after the end of Juncker’s term in 2019) new research is 
needed to deduce a possible causal link between his leadership style and the evolution of the 
EU.   
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Appendix 
Weblinks to the materials used in ProfilerPlus 
NON SPONTANEOUS MATERIALS 
Speech by President Juncker at the Plenary session of the European Parliament on the 
presentation of the programme of activities of the Bulgarian Presidency 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-303_en.htm 
Speech by President Juncker at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament on the 
guidelines on the framework of future EU-UK relations 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-1881_en.htm 
Speech by President Juncker at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament ahead of the 
European Council meeting of 22 and 23 March 2018 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-1901_en.htm 
Statement - Meeting of President Juncker and President Tusk with President Poroshenko 
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-6356_en.pdf 
Speech by President Juncker at the European Parliament Plenary session on the Economic 
and Monetary Union 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-6328_en.htm 
Remarks by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the joint press conference with Donald Tusk, 
President of the European Council, and Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, following 
the EU-Canada Summit 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3583_en.htm 
Speech by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker at the 20th anniversary of 
the European Policy Centre - "The road to Rome: from crisis management to governing the 
EU" 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3433_en.htm 
Remarks by Jean-Claude JUNCKER, President of the EC, at the joint press conference with 
Donald TUSK, European Council President, in Beijing, China 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2523_en.htm 
Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the EP Plenary Session on the review of the 
Dutch Presidency of the Council of the EU 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2412_en.htm 
Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Annual General Meeting of the Hellenic 
Federation of Enterprises (SEV) 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2293_en.htm 
Transcript of President Jean-Claude Juncker's press conference on Greece 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5274_en.htm 
Remarks by President Juncker at the joint press conference with Theresa May, Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-5181_en.htm 
Press statement by European Commission President Juncker on the occasion of the visit of 
Mike Pence, Vice-President of the United States 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-313_en.htm 
 
Remarks by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Opening Ceremony 
of the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the EU 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-48_en.htm 
Press point remarks by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the joint press point with Donald 
Tusk, President of the European Council and Barack Obama, President of the United States 
at the EU-US Leaders' Summit 
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http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2457_en.htm 
President Jean-Claude Juncker's Speaking Points at a Joint Press Conference at the G20 in 
Brisbane 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-1800_en.htm 
Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the debate in the European Parliament on the 
conclusions of the Special European Council on 23 April: ‘Tackling the migration crisis’ 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4896_en.htm 
Speech by President Juncker at the EP Plenary – Preparation of the European Council 
meeting of 17-18 December 2015 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-6346_en.htm 
Speech by President Juncker at the Conference "EU Budget focused on Results" 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5696_en.htm 
Speech of European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker on the review of the Latvian 
Presidency and ahead of the Euro summit on Greece 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5319_en.htm 
Closing remarks by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker at the EPSC 
High-Level Conference "Europe as an Investment Destination" 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-1291_en.htm 
Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the 2016 Spring Meetings of the IMF, World 
Bank flagship event on 'Forced Displacement: A Global Development Challenge' 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-1427_en.htm 
Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the 20th Saint Petersburg International 
Economic Forum 2016 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2234_en.htm 
Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker to the plenary session of the European Parliament 
on the result of the referendum in the United Kingdom 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2353_en.htm 
Opening remarks by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker ahead of the G20 
Summit at the joint press conference with Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, in 
Hangzhou, China 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2946_en.htm 
State of the Union 2015 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm 
State of the Union 2016 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm 
State of the Union 2017 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm 
Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the closing plenary session of the European 
Business Summit 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2043_en.htm 
Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, at the European 
Dinner on the eve of the Munich Security Conference 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-296_en.htm 
Statement by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the visit of the College to Prime Minister of 
the Slovak Republic, Robert Fico 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2373_en.htm 
Remarks by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the joint press point with Joseph Muscat, 
Prime Minister of Malta 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3744_en.htm 
European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's remarks at the joint press point with 
European Council President Donald Tusk, and Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-862_en.htm 
Speech by President Juncker at the Opening Ceremony of the European Year for 
Development 2015 
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http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-3100_en.htm 
Investing in Europe: speech by President Juncker in the European Parliament plenary session 
on the € 315 billion Investment Plan 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-2160_en.htm 
 
SPONTANEOUS MATERIALS 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/juncker-interview-europeans-must-learn-world-affairs-
a-1151422.html 
 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/11/20/inenglish/1511177283_048948.html 
https://www.cvce.eu/en/histoire-orale/unit-content/-/unit/22e64e56-f502-440b-86a2-
4b509adbb26e/b0445864-7442-4feb-86ef-f63e06af8517/Resources 
http://www.dw.com/en/jean-claude-juncker-migrants-need-legal-ways-to-come-to-europe/a-
41556151 
https://www.marketnews.com/content/transcript-part-2-interview-eus-jean-claude-juncker 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-jean-claude-juncker-and-martin-schulz-
a-1102110.html 
http://www.euronews.com/2017/09/15/heres-exactly-what-juncker-said-on-catalonia 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-6091_en.htm 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5135_en.htm 
http://time.com/4671785/jean-claude-juncker-brexit-russia-trump/ 
https://www.ft.com/content/cca3611b-be5d-3c96-9dda-eb1ee8663dd8 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2033_en.htm 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-47_en.htm 
http://www.presidency.ro/en/media/press-statements/joint-press-conference-by-president-of-
romania-mr-klaus-iohannis-and-president-of-the-european-commission-mr-jean-claude-juncker-
together-with-the-european-commissioner-for-regional-policy-mrs-corina-cretu 
 
